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DID THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
ACTUALLY EXPIRE?
Carl Tobias*
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) was intended to reduce
the expense and delay associated with federal district court litigation
by requiring courts to study and adopt new procedures. The CJRA's
gains, however, may be erased by the uncertainty surrounding its
sunset provision. Professor Tobias argues that Congress or the Judi-
cial Conference should resolve the uncertainty by proclaiming that
the CJRA has expired, thus forcing districts to abrogate procedures
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 1990, President George Bush signed into
law the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990.1 The CJRA
instituted unprecedented nationwide experimentation with
procedures for reducing cost and delay in federal civil litiga-
tion. Pursuant to the CJRA, all ninety-four federal district
courts undertook comprehensive evaluation of their circum-
stances, such as the size and complexity of caseloads, and
adopted and implemented various measures which were in-
tended to save expense and time.2 Some of the procedures that
districts employed were efficacious and decreased cost or delay.3
Additional features of the experimentation were less beneficial,
however, and certain aspects even had detrimental impacts. For
example, numerous districts promulgated or enforced measures
which conflicted with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP), United States Code (U.S.C.) provisions, and strictures
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada at Las
Vegas. B.A., 1968, Duke University; LL.B., 1972, University of Virginia Law School. I
was a University of Montana School of Law faculty member at the time that I com-
pleted most of the work on this article. I wish to thank Edward Cavanagh, Patrick
Longan, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions; Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte
Wilmerton for processing this piece; and Ann and Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for
generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 tit. I, § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089, 5090-98 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)).
2. See infra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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in other courts." Districts also prescribed CJRA requirements
through civil justice expense and delay reduction plans, proce-
dures of individual judges, and unwritten local practices or
understandings.5 These phenomena may even have increased
cost and delay in federal civil litigation by complicating the
efforts of attorneys and parties to find, master, and satisfy lo-
cal requirements.6
Now that December 1, 1997, the date on which the CJRA
was ostensibly scheduled to expire, has come and gone, judges,
lawyers, and litigants in every federal district court across the
country should ask whether the legislation actually expired.
The answer to this question has significant theoretical and
policy implications for the future of federal civil procedure and
important pragmatic consequences for federal civil practice.
For instance, if the statute expired, measures adopted pursu-
ant to the legislation, especially those imposed in civil justice
expense and delay reduction plans or those that are inconsis-
tent with the FRCP or Acts of Congress, are no longer
applicable. If the CJRA did not expire, procedures prescribed
under the statute remain effective. Until the issue of whether
the CJRA expired on December 1, 1997 is definitively resolved,
confusion and uncertainty among participants in federal civil
litigation will persist.
The difficulties considered above indicate that whether the
CJRA in fact expired last December warrants analysis. This
Article undertakes that effort. It initially affords a brief ex-
amination of the developments which led to the current
situation. Part II assesses whether the statute in fact expired
on December 1, 1997. The final section offers suggestions for
the future, concluding that either Congress or the Judicial
Conference should act to end the uncertainty.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION
Congress passed the CJRA in 1990, and the legislation be-
came effective on December 1 of that year.7 The statute
4. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
5. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvement Acts, 46
STAN.L.REv. 1589, 1618 (1994).
6. See id. at 1620-21.
7. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 tit. I, § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089, 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)); see also Carl
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required all ninety-four federal districts to develop civil justice
cost and delay reduction plans which were to include measures
for saving expense and time in civil lawsuits.' The districts
were to consider, and could adopt, eleven congressionally pre-
scribed principles, guidelines, and techniques of litigation
management and cost and delay reduction.9 The legislation
also proffered a twelfth open-ended provision which author-
ized courts to employ any other measure that might prove
efficacious in limiting expense or delay.0
Numerous districts implemented the CJRA by promulgating
or applying local strictures which were inconsistent with the
FRCP and other federal statutes, or local rules in the remain-
ing district courts." Perhaps most notorious was the Eastern
District of Texas. This court's civil justice expense and delay
reduction plan explicitly and forcefully declared that "[t]o the
extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsis-
tent with this Plan, the Plan has precedence and is
controlling." 2 For example, the court adopted an offer of judg-
ment provision which conflicted with FRCP 68.'3 Other
districts promulgated or applied inconsistent local require-
ments, but few courts prescribed the strictures as clearly or
Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1402-03 (1992).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994). See generally Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Can Systemic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts Be Remedied by Local
Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 721 (1993) (describing and evaluating the reform meas-
ures of the CJRA).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1)-(6), (b)(1)-(5) (1994).
10. See id. § 473(b)(6). Congress intended to encourage broad experimentation
with numerous procedures and to include measures which proved effective in the
FRCP. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1292-96 (1994). See generally Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure:
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1464-70 (1994)
(analyzing the rulemaking power given to local courts under the CJRA).
11. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1416-18. Some of these conflicting measures,
however, covered discovery, and certain 1993 FRCP amendments expressly empow-
ered districts to use inconsistent local procedures to govern discovery. See, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(a)(1); see also infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
12. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF TEXAS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 11 (1991) [hereinafter TEXAS PLAN]; see also Tobias, supra
note 5, at 1620.
13. See TEXAS PLAN, supra note 12, at 12; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 68. See gener-
ally Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45
DUKE L.J. 929 (1996) (describing the conflicts between the Federal Rules and the
Texas plan).
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enforced them as aggressively as the Eastern District of
Texas.14
Congress provided for periodic assessment of the experi-
mentation conducted by the federal district courts. The CJRA
required that every court annually evaluate the effectiveness
of the measures that the district applied. 5 Congress also called
for an "independent organization with expertise in the area of
Federal court management" to perform a thorough analysis of
procedures being enforced in the pilot program implemented
by ten districts under the CJRA. is Moreover, Congress re-
quested that the Judicial Conference of the United States
(Judicial Conference), the federal courts' policymaking compo-
nent, in consultation with the Federal Judicial Center (FJC)
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(Administrative Office), the research arms of the federal
courts, comprehensively assess the efficacy of procedures
which five districts applied in the statutorily prescribed dem-
onstration program. 7 Congress concomitantly asked that the
Judicial Conference submit reports on both projects and a rec-
ommendation on the pilot effort. The Judicial Conference
tendered these reports and the suggestion to Congress in May
1997.18
Unfortunately, the Judicial Conference did not explicitly
state, in either these reports or the recommendation, whether
the CJRA actually expired on December 1, 1997. The first ses-
sion of the 105th Congress recessed in November 1997 without
14. See Carrington, supra note 13, at 965.
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1994). See, e.g., US. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF
MONTANA, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY RE-
DUCTION PLAN (1994) [hereinafter MONTANA ANNUAL ASSESSMENT]; ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY (1996).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 471 note. See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY
AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996) (analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness of the CJRA).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note. The FJC actually undertook the study. See DONNA
STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT
ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1997).
18. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1990 FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF COST AND DELAY
ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES AND TECHNIQUES (1997), reprinted in 175
F.R.D. 62 (1997) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]. The Conference at-
tached the RAND Corporation's study as Appendix A and the FJC study as Appendix
B to the report. See generally Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990: Requiescat in Pace, 173 F.R.D. 565, 588 (1997) (discussing the report's treatment
of the RAND study).
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definitively resolving this question. Moreover, most districts
have continued to apply local procedures which they adopted
under the CJRA. Thus, whether the legislation expired last
December, remains an important question.
II. ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THE CJRA EXPIRED
The CJRA was apparently scheduled to expire on December
1, 1997.19 The statute expressly states in section 103(a) that
the "requirements set forth in sections 471 through 478 of title
28, United States Code [the CJRAI ... shall remain in effect
for seven years after ... [the December 1, 1990 enactment
date].,2° The relevant legislative history of the 1990 statute is
sparse and somewhat ambiguous. Congress stated:
Subsection (b)(2) subjects section 471 through 478 of the
Civil Justice Reform Act to a seven-year sunset provision
so that those sections can be thoroughly tested. Upon the
expiration of the seven-year period following enactment,
Federal district courts are no longer required to operate
pursuant to the civil justice expense and delay reduction
plans mandated by title I. Congress and the courts will
then have a chance to evaluate those provisions and, if
warranted, reauthorize them.2
Congress, therefore, apparently intended that the federal
districts could discontinue applying the cost and delay reduc-
tion procedures on December 1, 1997. Congress also seems to
have contemplated that the legislative and judicial branches
would make an affirmative decision about the reauthorization
of the CJRA and the future of the measures which courts em-
ployed pursuant to the enactment.' However, the first session
of the 105th Congress recessed in mid-November without con-
clusively resolving the issue of the statute's continuing
applicability.
19. I rely in this subsection on Patrick Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the
Long Range Plan, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 665 (1997); see also Tobias, supra note 5, at
1601-04, 1617-23.
20. § 103(a), 104 Stat. at 5096.
21. S. REP. No. 101-416, at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6852-
53 (emphasis added); see also Longan, supra note 19.
22. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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Congress did take some relevant action before recessing. It
passed legislation that specifically authorized continuation of
the case reporting requirements of section 476 of the CJRA.ss
This provision of the CJRA requires the Administrative Office
to prepare semiannual public statistical summaries regarding
the status of motions and bench trials that have been pending
for more than six months and of cases that have been pending
longer than three years. 4 In the same 1997 statute, Congress
also deleted section 476, which included strictures on report-
ing, and section 471, which mandated that districts adopt civil
justice expense and delay reduction plans, from the list of the
CJRA's provisions which section 103(a) of the CJRA stated
were to "remain in effect for seven years after" the December
1, 1990 date of CJRA passage. 5 The deletion of section 476
reinforces the argument that Congress intended to extend the
reporting requirements. Apart from this change, the 1997 leg-
islation essentially left section 103(a) as Congress adopted it
in 1990.26
The 1997 statute actually created additional ambiguity by
deleting section 471, which commanded districts to describe
civil justice expense and delay reduction plans, from the list of
provisions whose requirements section 103(a) of the CJRA
specifically stated were to remain in effect until December 1,
1997.27 This 1997 legislative action could evidence congres-
sional intent to extend authorization for civil justice plans and
the procedures which districts included in those plans past
December 1, 1997, as with the reporting requirements of sec-
tion 476.2 Discussions with staff members of the Judiciary
Committees of the United States Senate and the House of
Representatives, however, suggest that the omission of section
471 from the list of sections enumerated in the 1997 provision
was inadvertent.29 Therefore, Congress apparently intended
23. See Act of Oct. 6, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 1173 (1997).
24. See id.
25. See id. (amending § 103(a), 104 Stat. at 5096); see also supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
26. Compare Act of Oct. 6, 1997 § 2, 111 Stat. at 1173 with § 103(a), 104 Stat. at
5096.
27. See Act of Oct. 6, 1997 § 2, 111 Stat. at 1173; see also supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
28. Congress also approved the indefinite continuation of court-annexed arbitra-
tion in twenty districts which had been experimenting with this form of ADR because
that experimentation was scheduled to expire in 1997. See Act of Oct. 6, 1997 § 1, 111
Stat. at 1173.
29. See Telephone Interview with David Schanzer, Counsel, Senate Judiciary
Comm. (Dec. 5, 1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
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that section 471, like sections 472 through 475 and 477
through 478, would only remain in effect until December 1,
1997 and would not be extended like section 476.30
A final piece of relevant information is the explanation af-
forded by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.) for offering the
1997 proposal to extend the CJRA's reporting strictures: "This
very effective reporting requirement will expire in December
unless Congress acts."3' Senator Biden's statement suggests
his belief that the commands related to reporting, and perhaps
other important aspects of the 1990 Act, namely the require-
ments imposed by the sections enumerated in section 103(a),
would have expired on December 1, 1997 without legislative
action. A single senator's observation regarding one provision
of a statute nearly seven years after the enactment's passage
would ordinarily be considered relatively unauthoritative. The
statement, however, assumes considerable significance be-
cause Senator Biden, who served as the chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1990, was the chief proponent of the
CJRA and the sponsor of the amendment that became section
2 of the 1997 statute, which extended the CJRNs reporting re-
quirements and addressed section 103(a) of the CJRA.32
In the November 1997 edition of The Third Branch, the
newsletter of the federal courts, the Administrative Office an-
nounced that "most of the provisions of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) will expire December 1, 1997."3 As
the statute's expiration approached, the Administrative Office
Telephone Interview with Vince Garlock, Counsel, House Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 5,
1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
30. Section 103(a) could also be read to mean that districts and the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts need not comply with any 'continuing duties" which the
CJRA imposed after the December 1, 1997 date had passed. Illustrative is section
471's requirement to implement a plan; section 475's requirement to assess district
experimentation annually; and section 476s requirement to report certain informa-
tion. See § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. at 5090-94. The 1997 statute
extended the reporting requirements, but the other two continuing duties arguably
expired. Section 103(a), however, does not clearly state that plans expire, meaning
that plans retain the CJRAs imprimatur until Congress affirmatively acts or districts
choose to discontinue operating under plans. Id. at 5096.
31. 143 CONG. REC. S8528 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden).
32. See 143 CONG. REC. S8614-15 (daily ed. July 31, 1997); see also Act of Oct. 6,
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 1173; supra notes 23-25, and accompanying
text. Some of Senator Biden's writing also suggests that he believed that the statute
expired on December 1, 1997. See, e.g., Biden, supra note 10, at 1294; see also Joseph
R. Biden, Jr., Introduction to Symposium on the Civil Justice Reform Act, 67 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. i-vi (1993).
33. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Sunsets Next Month, THIRD BRANCH,
Nov. 1997, at 6.
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offered advice to district courts about numerous issues, in-
cluding continued application of those procedures adopted in
civil justice cost and delay reduction plans:
Courts should be aware that if their civil justice expense-
and delay-reduction plans were implemented pursuant to
the CJRA alone, rather than through a court order or lo-
cal rule, their authority will sunset with the act.
Therefore, these courts may consider adopting their plans
pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2071(e), which
allows for the immediate adoption of rules, and start the
formal rule-making process promptly thereafter.'
This information, which offers the view of an important re-
search arm of the federal courts, may clarify the question
regarding the effect that the passing of the December 1 date
had on the CJRA and on measures adopted in plans pursuant
to the legislation. The advice, however, does not address appli-
cability of local requirements promulgated under the 1990
enactment that are inconsistent with the FRCP or federal
statutes.
The most plausible reading of the CJRA's phrasing and leg-
islative history, and the best interpretation of the congressional
action and the Judicial Conference silence reviewed above, is
that the failure to reauthorize or extend more clearly the statu-
tory program means that the enactment expired on December 1.
Because the CJRAs language, which provides that the Act's
major requirements "shall remain in effect for seven years" is
rather clear, it is arguably unnecessary to consult the accompa-
nying legislative history.35 Even if the statutory wording were
more ambiguous, the relevant legislative history is relatively
unclear and, therefore, comparatively unreliable." Finally, Con-
gress expressed a policy in favor of a nationally uniform civil
procedure in the 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act (JIA),37 as did the Supreme Court in the 1995 revi-
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 117 S. Ct. 1032, 1035 (1997) ("Given the
straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative his-
tory"); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 147 (1993) (noting that recourse to legislative
history is unnecessary if the statutory text is unclear).
36. Experience with similar provisions in other statutes suggests that courts find
a legislative failure to reauthorize on the expiration date means that the Act has ex-
pired. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 59-68 (1982).
See generally SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 34 (5th ed. 1993).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994).
[VOL. 31:4
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
sion to FRCP 83, which proscribed the adoption of local meas-
ures that conflict with the FRCP or U.S.C. provisions.8
Because the 1990 CJRA has arguably expired, this policy fa-
voring national uniformity should have precedence over
interpretations of the CJRA that would permit the continued
application of inconsistent local procedures.
If this construction is correct, any procedures which the
ninety-four districts promulgated or applied pursuant to the
CJRA, and which conflict with the FRCP or U.S.C. provisions,
have also expired3 9 Measures included in local rules that
courts prescribed or enforced under the CJRA which are con-
sistent with the FRCP or federal statutes remain applicable,
because both the Rules Enabling Act and FRCP 83 authorize
the districts to issue and apply local rules that comport with
the FRCP and the U.S.C. 40 One significant exception to the
propositions regarding inconsistent local measures, premised
partly on the CJRA, are the provisions in certain 1993 FRCP
amendments, principally governing discovery, which empower
district courts to promulgate and implement procedures that
vary from the FRCP." Illustrative is the prescription in FRCP
26(a)(1) for mandatory pre-discovery disclosure, whereby many
districts have applied local requirements which depart from
those included in FRCP 26(a)(1). 42
An informal survey of the federal districts indicates that few
courts have abrogated, or intend to abolish, conflicting local
procedures adopted pursuant to the CJRA.4'3 This can be ex-
plained principally by judges' and attorneys' understandable
38. See FED. R. CIv. P. 83; see also Tobias, supra note 5, at 1620-27; infra note 47
and accompanying text. See generally Robel, supra note 10, at 1468-69.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 83. See generally Robel, supra note 10,
at 1468-69.
40. See 28 US.C. § 2071(a); FED. R. CIv. P. 83; see also supra note 38 and accom-
panying text. See generally Tobias, supra note 5, at 1600-01, 1604-06.
41. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), (d), (f).
42. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) with D. MONT. R. 200-5(a) and LOCAL RULES
W.D. WASH. CR 26. See also DONNA STIENSTRA, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC A'TENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES
TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIL PROCEDURE 26 (1998)
(analyzing districts' treatment of disclosure); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 6, 34 (proposing that the Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure reevaluate the need for national consistency in applying FRCP 26(a) in its
continuing reexamination of discovery and determine whether the benefits of national
uniformity in applying FRCP 26(a) outweigh the advantages of locally-developed
measures).
43. This survey was premised on conversations with judges, lawyers, and parties
who participate in civil litigation in numerous districts, and on an evaluation of nu-
merous districts' local procedures.
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reluctance to eliminate familiar and efficacious measures."
For example, some districts' increased reliance on magistrate
judges, various alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices,
and telephonic conferences for resolving disputes, has saved
45time and resources.
Until Congress or the Judicial Conference conclusively clari-
fies whether the CJRA has actually expired, confusion over the
applicability of inconsistent local procedures prescribed pur-
suant to the CJRA will continue. For instance, counsel and
parties may experience difficulty in ascertaining whether local
measures adopted under the CJRA remain effective after De-
cember 1, 1997 and, if so, whether they exist in local rules,
civil justice expense and delay reduction plans, standing or-
ders, individual-judge practices, or informal understandings.46
Attorneys and litigants may correspondingly encounter prob-
lems determining whether local procedures conflict with the
FRCP, Acts of Congress, or requirements of other federal dis-
tricts and, if so, whether they must comply with the local
measures.
Absent action by either Congress or the Judicial Conference,
local strictures which are inconsistent with the FRCP or U.S.C.
provisions will continue to apply in numerous districts. Of
course, the Circuit Judicial Councils could invoke the 1988
JIA, or FRCP 83, to eliminate or modify local requirements
that contravene the FRCP or federal legislation, but few coun-
cils have rigorously discharged this responsibility and they
appear unlikely to do so in the future.4'7 Attorneys and litigants
who have been disadvantaged by application of conflicting lo-
cal measures adopted under the CJRA may also challenge the
44. See generally Longan, supra note 19, at 665 ("Local judges and lawyers who
drafted the plans may have substantial stakes in their continued operation.").
45. Illustrative as to magistrate judges are MONTANA ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, su-
pra note 15, at 3-4; REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP TO
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON APPOINTED UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 7, 17-18 (1991). Illustrative as to ADR is
STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 17, at 215-82. Illustrative as to telephonic conferences
are ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE DISTRICT OF MAINE PURSUANT TO
THE CIVL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 2 (1996); STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 17, at 10. I
realize that courts might be able to premise increased reliance on these methods on
authority other than that in the CJRA. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 636, 651-58 (1994); FED.
R. CIV. P. 16.
46. The Administrative Office advised the districts that measures included in
plans would expire on December 1. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
47. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071(c)(1) (1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (authorizing
district courts to make and amend rules). See generally Carl Tobias, A Sixth Circuit
Story, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 983 (1996); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court
Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359 (1995).
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procedures' validity. They might argue that the statute expired
in December 1997, thus, the districts lack the requisite
authority to continue enforcing inconsistent local strictures.
These lawyers and parties could also rely upon a recent Fifth
Circuit opinion which invalidated a fee-shifting provision that
a district court had prescribed pursuant to the CJRA. s The
Fifth Circuit found that the statute "did not grant district
courts the discretion to use fee shifting as a cost and delay re-
duction technique... ""
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Congress or the Judicial Conference should expeditiously
resolve the uncertainty about the expiration of the CJRA be-
cause lingering doubt related to the continuing applicability of
the statute and local procedures adopted under the legislation
complicates federal civil practice. Congress originally passed
the statute in 1990 and is thus the preferable entity to address
this confusion. Congress should state clearly whether the leg-
islation has expired and reauthorize specifically the statutory
features that have been efficacious." Congress at least must
correct the inadvertent omission of CJRA section 471 from the
provisions which it apparently intended would expire on De-
cember 1, 1997. 5'
If Congress does not act, the Judicial Conference should at-
tempt to clarify the issue by expressly stating that the CJRA
has expired and that inconsistent measures applied pursuant
to the legislation must be abolished. The Conference should
then inform all ninety-four district courts of its position. Most
of the districts probably would comply with the Judicial Con-
ference's resolution of this question because the Conference, as
the policy making arm of the federal courts, speaks with con-
siderable authority on issues of court administration and
48. See Ashland Chem., Inc. v. Barco, Inc., 123 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
Aldrich v. Bowen, 130 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1997); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 885 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Carrington, supra note 13; Robel, supra
note 10.
49. Barco, 123 F.3d at 268.
50. For instance, the Judicial Conference called for continuation of the advisory
group process because it facilitated the participation of litigants and lawyers in the
administration of justice in every district. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 18-20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 478 (1994).
51. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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statutory interpretation. 2 Finally, should Congress or the Con-
ference fail to act, each district should attempt to reduce
confusion by abrogating local procedures prescribed under the
CJRA which conflict with the FRCP or federal legislation.
CONCLUSION
Although the seven-year experiment with CJRA procedures
which was designed to decrease expense and delay in civil liti-
gation has apparently concluded, considerable uncertainty
remains about whether the statute actually expired on De-
cember 1, 1997. Congress or the Judicial Conference should
promptly resolve this lingering doubt over the legislation's
continuing applicability because the resulting uncertainty
complicates federal civil practice.
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). See generally Tracy Edler Leduc, A Judicial Con-
ference Primer, FED. LAW., MarJApr. 1997, at 66 (giving a general overview of the
functions of the Judicial Conference).
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